Almost everything about the situation in Yugoslavia is immersed in ambivalence.  Following the post-election revolutionary catharsis marked by celebrations in the streets and the burning of parliament, the country seems to have emerged in a state of limbo with innumerable unknowns.

Milosevic’s reappearance on the scene in recognition of the opposition leader’s victory is particularly steeped in ambiguity.  If his congratulatory handshake with Kostunica was comforting, the one with Russian foreign minister Ivanov was disquieting.

On the one hand, Ivanov’s presence ofered a strong legitimacy to the victory of Kostunica, representing great mother Russia’s support for the second Slavic orthodox power on the European continent.  On the other, his visit to see the outgoing president in his hermitage at Dedinje prompts doubts about the true nature of Russia’s intentions.

Was it just a dutiful visit of circumstance or an extreme attempt at mediating a compromise between the two presidents?  Is this the preamble to a situation in which Milosevic will be head of the opposition, i.e., head of a parliament dominated by ex communists, on one side, with a weak democratic president on the other?

This scenario sounds explosively similar to the one faced by Yeltsin in Russia in 1991:  daily skirmishes that led to a violent showdown with a hostile parliament made up of old communists and new chauvinists.

From Kostunica’s first pronouncements it is easy to deduce just how much he is conditioned by a parliament that is friendly toward Milosevic and 40% of the Serbian electorate who voted for the former president. Kostunica is being forced to revive the usual nationalistic slogans rather than give priority to his promises of democracy, civil rights, and reconciliation with Europe.  Totally out of tune with his campaign slogans, he’s had to anachronistically declare “serenity for all, the return of Kosovo under Serbia’s national sovereignty, and the strengthening of the relationship with Montenegro” as his first priorities.

However, what does “the return of Kosovo to national sovereignty mean” when 2 million Albanian Kosovars boycotted the Serbian elections, refuse to speak Serbian, and use the German Mark instead of the Yugoslavian dinar?  What is the meaning of a “strengthening of the relationship with Montenegro” when 80% of the population demonstrated their will to weaken that relationship and release themselves from the “federal” bond with Serbia through their massive abstinence in the voting process on September 24th?  What is the significance of “serenity for all” with Slobo Milosevic not only still at large, but preparing to head the opposition, notwithstanding the international mandate for his arrest for his responsibility in the propagation of genocide and war crimes?

A Kostunica who reaches out to shake the hand of Milosevic, a cohabitation of the two enemies, the proponent of democracy and the former dictator, offer a hybrid democraship to the post communist Balkan world that can only be described as disquieting.

October 2000

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